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Walker Sterling

A BROKEN SHIELD: A PLEA FOR FORMALITY IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

Robin Walker Sterling*
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile justice system swallows children of color at a
shockingly disproportionate rate. The data is uncontroverted and bears
repeating. In 2008, children of color comprised 22% of the country’s
youth population, but constituted 54% of children arrested for violent
crimes and 35% of children arrested for property crimes.1 When a
white juvenile and a black juvenile with similar backgrounds are each
charged with the same drug offense, the black juvenile is nine times
more likely to be detained.2 Finally, one in three black juveniles can
expect to go to prison in his lifetime.3
Explanations focusing on demographics, arrest rates, and rates
of offending fail to account for the disparity.4 Moreover, data gathered
using modern self-report methods5 suggest that the rates of juvenile
drug offending are static across races. This conclusion undermines the
hypothesis that African American children are more involved with the
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; J.D., New York
University School of Law; B.A., Yale College. Former staff attorney with the Public
Defender Services for the District of Columbia; supervising attorney at the
Children’s Law Center; special counsel with the National Juvenile Defender Center
in Washington D.C.
1
CRYSTAL KNOLL & MELISSA SICKMUND, Delinquency Cases in Juvenile Court,
2008, Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Fact Sheet, 2 (Dec.
2011), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/236479.pdf. In 2008, white youth
accounted for 78% of the U.S. juvenile population, black youth 16%, Asian youth
(including Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander) 5%, and American Indian
youth (including Alaska Native) 1%. Id.
2
W. Haywood Burns Inst. for Juvenile Justice Fairness and Equity,
Disproportionate Minority Confinement/Contact (DMC),
http://www.burnsinstitute.org/downloads/FACT%20SHEET%20BI.doc (last visited
Oct. 13, 2013).
3
Id.
4
Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In Re Gault and the Road Not
Taken, 72 MD. L. REV. 607, 661 (2013) (arguing that rates of offending are static
across racial and ethnic groups and that it is more likely that the acknowledged
conscious and unconscious bias account for the disproportionate minority contact).
5
Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of
Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV.
383, 415 (2013) (detailing modern methods that ensure that self-report surveys are
“as reliable, if not more reliable than, most social science measures”).

Walker Sterling

238

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 13:2

juvenile justice system simply because they commit a disproportionate
share of crimes.6
A probable explanation is conscious and unconscious bias.7
This bias takes hold at all points of discretion in the juvenile justice
system.8 As one noted scholar wrote, “individualized discretion is
often synonymous with racial disparities in sentencing.”9 The numbers
reinforce this belief. Between 2002 and 2004, black juveniles—16%
of the youth population — had the misfortune of accounting for 28%
of juvenile arrests, 30% of court referrals, 37% of detained youth, 38%
of youth placed out of their home, 34% of youth waived to adult court,
and 58% of youth locked in adult prisons.10
The juvenile justice system poses a singular threat to children
of color because the juvenile justice procedure lacks formality. In the
place of formality is discretion, and every point of discretion functions
as another foothold for implicit bias. This informality is enshrined in
Supreme Court doctrine that was built on the late-nineteenth century
“Child Savers” narrative. The “Child Savers” founded the early
juvenile court according to rehabilitative principles of “fairness, of
concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention.”11 This dominant
narrative informed the Court’s decision in In re Gault.12 In re Gault
grounded the procedural rights of juvenile defendants in the
6

See id. at 414–15 (arguing that there is a disparity between self-reported drug use
and drug arrests for African American and Hispanic children, which could be
explained by “increased police presence” in their neighborhoods and communities,
as well as police racial and ethnic bias).
7
See generally Geoff Ward, Aaron Kupchik, Laurin Parker & Brian Chad Starks,
Racial Politics of Juvenile Justice Policy Support: Juvenile Court Worker
Orientations Toward Disproportionate Minority Confinement, RACE & JUSTICE, 154,
158–59, 175 (2011) ( noting studies showing white probation officers were more
likely to make “negative internal attributions about Black youth delinquency,” and
explaining their studies findings that race effects are relevant to differential treatment
within the juvenile justice system).
8
Walker Sterling, supra note 4, at 661.
9
Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691,
714.
10
Katayoon Majd, Students of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54 HOW. L.J. 343, 360
(2011).
11
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971).
12
387 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1967) (discussing the history of the Child Savers movement
and the refusal to grant juveniles the same rights as adults in criminal proceedings
because children were viewed as innocent and incarcerating them with adults did not
rehabilitate or protect them, which is what they believed should have been
happening).
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minimalistic due process concept of “fundamental fairness” rather than
in the full fundamental rights afforded to adult criminal defendants
under the United States Constitution.13
Uncritically relying on the Child Savers narrative suppresses
the alternative narrative detailing the experience of children of color.14
Had the Court recognized this alternative narrative, the Court might
have seen that people of color did not experience “disillusionment”15
by the juvenile justice system at some point long ago; the Court would
have found that there was no such illusion to begin with. People of
color have received “the worst of both worlds”—a lack of
rehabilitative treatment and a lack of procedural protections—since the
start of the juvenile justice system.16
Gault, along with the other juvenile cases from the Warren
Court, is widely considered to be the apex of the juvenile due process
movement. Gault was the first case to extend many procedural rights
to juveniles, not least among them the right to counsel, by grounding
those rights in the limited doctrine of fundamental fairness. 17 But
Gault also splintered juvenile justice from the rest of the civil rights
movement and stunted its growth. The ramifications of this became all
too apparent in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, in which the Court refused
to recognize a juvenile right to trial by jury as part of the fundamental

13

Walker Sterling, supra note 4, at 646 (in an effort to maintain certain benefits of
the juvenile proceedings such as “confidentiality and rehabilitative services” the
Court in In re Gault refused to determine “that juvenile delinquency proceedings
were completely analogous to criminal trials,” thus expanding the Fourteenth
Amendment fundamental fairness balancing test as opposed to “the same
constitutional protections that check the government’s power in [adult] criminal
proceedings.”).
14
See generally Walker Sterling, supra note 4, Part IB (claiming children of color
were excluded from rehabilitative services, had fewer resources, and experienced
disproportionate contact with the justice system because of “racist attitudes towards
black children and their capabilities” ).
15
See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551 (the ultimate disillusionment occurs when
superimposing the criminal adjudicative process on the juvenile court system,
thereby eliminating the need for the juvenile court system if it is equivalent to the
adult system).
16
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
17
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21, 29–31 (1967) (holding juveniles are guaranteed similar
protections given to adults in criminal proceedings in accordance with Due Process
rights).
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fairness rubric.18 This holding has had disastrous implications for
children of color, who require procedural formalities as a shield
against the discriminatory impact of unfettered discretion.19
I previously discussed the topic of Gault’s failings in
Fundamental Unfairness.20 The purpose of this brief piece, written as
a companion to a talk I delivered at the University of Maryland
“Children at Risk” Symposium on November 9, 2012, is to expound
further on this topic. The past several terms demonstrate that the
Supreme Court has the constitutional rights of children accused of
crimes in sight.21 This opportunity to push for a realignment of
juvenile justice toward a full recognition of fundamental rights must
not be wasted. The need is urgent and the time is ripe.
Part I briefly reiterates the history of the juvenile justice
system, contrasting the dominant narrative of a progressive,
rehabilitative system with the true experience of children of color.
With that context set, I outline the major doctrines set forth in Gault
and the related juvenile cases of its era. I then go further than I did in
Fundamental Unfairness and discuss how the experiences of white
and minority youths continued to diverge after McKeiver. In Part II, I
explain how Gault and its progeny have left children of color exposed
to the implicit racial bias that permeates the system. Finally, in Part
III, I prescribe strategies to begin the overdue dismantling of the
machinery that imprisons, stigmatizes, and damages the lives of
children of color at a grossly disproportionate rate.

18

McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543–45. (holding a “jury is [not] a necessary component of
accurate fact finding,” and the juvenile standard of fundamental fairness does not
require one).
19
Id. at 528.
20
See generally Walker Sterling, supra note 4, Part II (arguing the Court’s failure to
note the disparate treatment of minority juveniles in the In re Gault decision led to
their flawed reasoning for basing their decision in the Fourteenth Amendment as
opposed to the Bill of Rights).
21
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the execution of a
juvenile offender younger than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of a
capital offense violated the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2033–34 (2010) (holding that the imposition of life without the possibility of
parole not guilty of homicide violates the Eighth Amendment); Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (holding that mandatory life without the possibility of
parole for those who were under 18 at the commission of their crime violates the
Eighth Amendment).
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I. HOW WE GOT HERE: HISTORY AND DOCTRINE
The racial history of the juvenile justice system and the
Supreme Court’s misstep in Gault work together to create a system
that is hostile and discriminatory towards children of color.22 The
legacies of slavery, Jim Crow, and the modern criminal justice system
have embedded stereotypes and bias deeply into the American
consciousness.23 The doctrinal underpinnings of the juvenile justice
system create discretion points at which these lurking racial
assumptions can express themselves in the form of harsher punishment
for children of color. This exposure to arbitrary treatment is disguised
in the sheep’s clothing of an informal, rehabilitative process.
A. Origins of the Juvenile Court
I begin with the juvenile court’s origins.24 Examining the
history of the juvenile court provides insight into the evolution of the
doctrine upon which modern-day juvenile jurisprudence rests. One
strand woven into this account is the well-known narrative of the
Child Savers’ campaign for a specialized juvenile court. It is on this
narrative that the Supreme Court would build a jurisprudence that
denies juvenile defendants refuge in the criminal procedure
amendments of the Bill of Rights.25 Justice Harlan instead nested
juvenile due process rights on the weaker footing of “fundamental
fairness.”26 Parallel to this narrative, I excavate the much-ignored but
22

See discussion infra Parts I. and II.
James Bell & Laura John Ridolfi, Adoration of the Question: Reflections on the
Failure to Reduce Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Juvenile Justice System, W.
Haywood Burns Institute, 8 (Dec. 2008), available at
http://www.burnsinstitute.org/downloads/BI%20Adoration%20of%20the%20Questi
on_2.pdf (noting historically unequal treatment was blatant and intentional resulting
in harsh conditions for juveniles of color, while comparing current juvenile polices
and finding that while they are race-neutral they have a discriminatory effect that we
have embraced by it being unchanged).
24
See generally Sanford Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1188–92 (stating a call for the “rescue of children from future
crime and degradation” began a movement to discipline children who were on a path
to criminal conduct).
25
See generally Walker Sterling, supra note 4, Part II.
26
See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966) (holding that due process
requirements apply to transfer proceedings); Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 59–60, 12
(1965)(holding that juveniles have right to notice of charges, right to counsel,
23
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all too real narrative of children of color in the juvenile justice system.
It is this narrative for which later doctrinal developments would fail to
account, thus embedding disproportionate minority contact (DMC)
into the juvenile justice system.27
The precursors to the juvenile court system were the Houses of
Refuge.28 In 1824, the New York legislature granted the Society for
the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents the authority to build the
New York House of Refuge, which opened in 1825.29 The House of
Refuge’s purpose was to “offer food, shelter, and education to the
homeless and destitute youth of New York, by and removing juvenile
offenders from the prison company of adult convicts[.]”30 By the terms
of its charter, only “proper objects” could be admitted to the House of
Refuge.31 “Proper objects” were generally poor white boys who were
deemed amenable to being saved from future criminality by residence
in the House.32
Black children were not admitted to the New York House of
refuge until 1834, reflecting racist attitudes regarding their
salvageability.33 Once admitted, black children were nevertheless
denied rehabilitation services to avoid “a waste of resources and a
debasement of [w]hites.”34 Similar patterns emerged in houses of
refuge opening elsewhere in the country. Philadelphia’s House of
Refuge, while teaching white boys agriculture and academics,
privilege against self-incrimination, and right to confrontation and cross-examination
in adjudicatory hearings in delinquency cases under the idea of “due process and
fairness”); Id. at 76 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
“prudence and principles of the Fourteenth Amendment alike require that the Court
should now impose no more procedural restrictions than are imperative to assure
fundamental fairness…”); See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 368 (1970)
(holding that fundamental fairness requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
delinquency adjudications).
27
Disproportionate Minority Contact, OJJDP IN FOCUS, Nov. 2012, at 1, available
at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/239457.pdf.
28
Sanford Fox, see supra note 24, at 1187.
29
Id. at 1187, 1189–90.
30
Id. at 1189.
31
Id. at 1190 (“Only ‘proper objects’ were to be sent to the House, not every
vagrant and criminal child”); See infra text accompanying note 32.
32
Id.; GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE 73 (2012) (noting poor white and immigrant European youths had
access to reformatories first and even when accessed by black children they held
“deep investments in white supremacist ideology”).
33
See Bell & Ridolfi supra note 23, at 3.
34
Id.
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consigned black boys to perform manual labor, and black girls to
vocational training as cooks, maids, and seamstresses.35 The impetus
for segregation was so strong that black children were locked away in
adult prisons in jurisdictions where houses of refuge only possessed
facilities for white children.36
Houses of Refuge did not open in the South until 1847, and no
reformatory for black youths existed in the South until 1873.37 A
primary motivation for opening the first black youth reformatory, the
Baltimore House of Reformation for Black Children, was “the need
for agricultural labor through [the] State, as well as the great want of
competent house servants” that arose once the South no longer had
access to slaves as a source of labor.38 Convict leasing—the practice of
leasing prisoners to private parties for forced labor—was widely used
to draw black people and children back into slavery.39 Both black
adults and black children were re-enslaved through the “convict labor
machine.”40
In Chicago, Illinois in 1899, a group of progressive reformers
known as the Child Savers successfully advocated for the creation of
the nation’s first separate juvenile court.41 The Child Savers were
animated by a “Rehabilitative Ideal” having three tenets: 1) children
are capable of rehabilitation; 2) proper intervention is sufficient for
rehabilitation, and; 3) rehabilitation was directed toward the end that
35

WARD, supra note 32, at 57-60 (claiming white youth were taught while at the
House of Refuge because they could assured of jobs upon release, whereas
convincing black youth to study was absurd because they were going to end up a part
of the servile pool and should instead be trained, not educated).
36
See Walker Sterling, supra note 4 at 624 (“in places that did not have separate
black juvenile facilities, black youth were often placed in adult prisons instead of in
white juvenile facilities with white youth”).
37
Id. at 625 (“Maryland opened the first and only southern reformatory for black
youths in 1873, almost fifty years after the New York House of Refuge opened its
doors”).
38
Id.; see also Cecile P. Frey, The House of Refuge for Colored Children, THE
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY Spring, 1981, at 10, 17–18 (“noting that the Board of
Managers of the House of Refuge for Colored Children in Philadelphia desired to
send the black children to a small farm in the country so that they could learn
agriculture and horticulture”). (citation omitted)
39
DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE
ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE, 37, 41–47 (1994).
40
Id. at 40–42, 46–47.
41
See WARD supra note 32 (noting that Progressive Era reformers can be credited
with developing the modern juvenile court, which is focused on preventing
delinquency through rehabilitation).
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“[a]ll Americans . . . become middle class Americans.”42 The Child
Savers were focused on the assimilation of poor white and European
immigrant youths.43
With its rehabilitative aim, the juvenile court “shun[ned] the
burdensome formalities of criminal procedures,” like rules of evidence
and jury trials.44 The informality was deemed conducive to
rehabilitation.45 This vision of juvenile justice proved so popular that
by 1925, juvenile courts had expanded to all but two states and
inspired laws across Europe, South America, and Asia.46
Black children did not receive the benefit of the rehabilitative
ideal. Unlike the poor, white, immigrant youth with whom white
Americans felt an affinity, black people were not deemed amenable to
rehabilitative efforts.47 Where white children received disproportionate
rehabilitative resources, black children received whippings.48 Mass
migration to the North in the early twentieth century did not spare
black children from disproportionately harsh sanctions. In 1926,
Detroit juvenile court complaints against black children were filed
more than twice as often as such complaints were filed against white
children.49 Between 1917 and 1928 in Detroit, black children
accounted for 12% of the population in custody there even though they
comprised merely 3.3% of the general population.50 Between 1900 and
1959, 70% of executions of people age eighteen and younger in the
United States were black.51
The narrative of progressive reform and individualized,
42

Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension between Apprendi and McKeiver:
Sentence Enhancements based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of
Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOR. L. REV. 1111, fn. 76 (2003).
43
WARD, supra note 32, at 87.
44
James E. Starrs, A Sense of Irony in Southern Juvenile Courts, 1 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 129, 134 (1966).
45
Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imaging Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
the Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1100 (1990)..
46
Tamar R. Brickhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y, 53, 64 (2012).
47
See WARD, supra note 32, at 86–87.
48
See WARD, supra note 32, at 115.
49
DAVID B. WOLCOTT, COPS AND KIDS: POLICING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN
URBAN AMERICA, 1890-1940 98 (2005)..
50
Id.
51
Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of
Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV.
383, 407 (2013).
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rehabilitative treatment in the juvenile justice system did not apply to
black children. The rehabilitative function of the juvenile courts was
envisioned as a means to integrate white immigrant youth into middle
class American society.52 Black children, who did not fit into that
paradigm, were subjected to social control through a quasi-criminal
process that retained the punitive consequences of adult court yet
lacked the formal protections afforded to adult defendants.
B. Due Process Comes to Juvenile Court: In re Gault and McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania
In re Gault concerned Gerald Gault, a minor who was arrested
and taken into custody for making a lewd phone call to a neighbor.53
One day later, a hearing was held in the judge’s chambers.54 The
juvenile court judge questioned Gerald directly.55 Neither Gerald nor
his parents received a copy of the petition to notify them of the
specific allegations.56 No defense attorneys or witnesses were present,
not even the witness to whom Gerald was alleged to have made the
lewd call.57 After a second, similar hearing,58 Gerald was adjudicated
delinquent and committed to the State Industrial School “for the period
of his minority.”59 For fifteen-year-old Gerald, that meant six years.60
The United States Supreme Court could not abide such
appallingly cursory procedure. In re Gault granted youths in
delinquency proceedings the rights to counsel, notice, confrontation,
and the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.61
Gault was handed down during a decade in which racial
equality proved a dominant theme in Supreme Court jurisprudence.62
52

See WARD, supra note 32 at 87.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
54
Id. at 4–5
55
Id. at 6.
56
Id. at 9.
57
Id. at 5.
58
Id. at 8.
59
Id. at 7.
60
Id. at 7–8.
61
Id. at 33, 41, 55–57.
62
Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L. J. 1035, 1037 (1977); see also Barry C. Feld, The
Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 1484, 1494 (1991)
(discussing the Warren Court’s “perceived . . . need to protect . . . minority
offenders” and desire to make its own contribution to the Civil Rights Movement by
53
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During this era, the Court extended many federal rights to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, including the right to counsel in
Gideon v. Wainwright.63 However, Gault is distinct from its adult
criminal procedural counterpart in that, rather than rooting the rights
of juveniles in the Bill of Rights like it had for adult defendants, 64 the
Gault Court rested juvenile procedure on Fourteenth Amendment
“fundamental fairness.”65 The most critical difference between these
doctrinal routes is that, unlike “fundamental rights” under the Bill of
Rights, “fundamental fairness” is subject to a balancing of equities.66
Specifically, the balancing test at play in Gault involved weighing the
value of a particular due process protection against the need for
informality, flexibility, and efficiency of juvenile court hearings.67
This framing of the issue embraces the Child Savers’ origin
story but ignores the actual experience of children of color. The Court
recounted that the early reformers were “appalled by adult procedures
and penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long prison
sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals” and were
“profoundly convinced that society's duty to the child could not be
confined by the concept of justice alone.”68 The Court went so far as to
say that the juvenile court was built upon “the highest motives and
most enlightened impulses . . . .”69 Such rhetoric makes it unsurprising
that the Court uncritically accepted the notion of a rehabilitative, nonpunitive juvenile court where the need for paternalistic informality and
freedom from procedural trappings played a strong enough role that it
could conceivably outweigh the due process protections afforded to
adults in criminal court.70
“focus[ing] on procedural rights” as an answer to the country’s profound “concern
about racial inequality”).
63
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
64
Id.
65
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
66
Walker Sterling, supra note 4, at 640.
67
See Gault, 387 U.S. at 13–14 (“The problem is to ascertain the precise impact of
the due process requirement upon such proceedings.”).
68
Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
69
Id. at 17.
70
Compare Gault, 387 U.S at 15 (“The early reformers were appalled by adult
procedures and penalties . . . .”); and Id. at 15–16 (“The apparent rigidities,
technicalities, and harshness which [early reformers] observed in both substantive
and procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime and
punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’
and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be
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The Gault Court blatantly ignored the fact that, for children of
color, juvenile proceedings were criminal trials under a different name
and that rehabilitative services were never provided evenly among the
races.71 If the Court had been willing to confront that reality, it may
have properly extended the full slate of fundamental criminal
procedure rights to juvenile court.
Fundamental fairness and fundamental rights analyses lead to
different outcomes. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court applied the
Sixth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment
and found that, under a fundamental rights analysis, all adults charged
with serious crimes were entitled to a trial by jury.72 On the other hand
in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court employed the fundamental
fairness analysis to find that juveniles in delinquency proceedings
have no right to a trial by jury.73
McKeiver consolidated a relatively typical juvenile case from
Pennsylvania74 with an extraordinary one from North Carolina.75 The
North Carolina case, In re Burrus, concerned approximately 45 black
schoolchildren, ages 11 to 15 years old, who were charged in juvenile
court with willfully impeding traffic while gathering to protest their
school district’s discriminatory policies.76 In both McKeiver and
Burrus, the trial court denied the defense’s request for a jury trial and
each of the children were found delinquent.77
Although the petitioner’s brief in Burrus underscored the
case’s racial overtones, the Court practically ignored that aspect of the
case.78 The McKeiver plurality deployed the amorphous Gault
‘clinical’ rather than punitive.”); with Id. at 22 (“the commendable principles relating
to the processing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults [under the idea
of parens patrie] are in no way involved or affected by the procedural rights of
[adult offenders]”).
71
Walker Sterling, supra note 4, at 627–628.
72
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
73
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543, 545 (1971).
74
Id. at 534–536.
75
Id. at 536–37.
76
Id. at 536; see also In re Burrus, 167 S.E.2d 454, 457 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
77
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 537.
78
Compare Burrus, 4 S.E.2d at 457 (calling the cases “a concentrated demonstration
by Negroes of Hyde County to assert their defiance of law and order and to disrupt
the normal economic and social life of Hyde County . . . .”), with Brief for Petitioner
at 32, In re Burrus, 4 S.E.2d 454 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969), No. 128, 1970 WL 121988
(stating “the hard won right of blacks to a trier of fact representative of the entire
community is surely as significant a protection to black youth as black adults”).
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balancing test, weighing various equities such as the importance of the
interest at stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest
because of the procedures used, the probable value of additional
procedural safeguards, the adequacy of available substitutes for the
requirement, costs, and other administrative concerns.79 Many of these
considerations could not be considered under a fundamental rights
approach, such as the substitute procedure of judicial fact-finding and
the administrative burden of jury trials.80
Although the plurality paid lip service to the juvenile system’s
failure to reach the rehabilitative ideal, it nevertheless refused to
eschew the Child Savers narrative.81 Couching its rhetoric in the
juvenile court’s ideal of “fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of
paternal attention,”82 and showing fear that the juvenile court might
become a “fully adversary process,”83 the Court refused to succumb to
“disillusionment” with basing the informal juvenile system on the
ideal that youths are uniquely amenable to rehabilitation.84
But people of color were already disillusioned. The Child
Savers ideal that the Court embraced wholesale was a device to
assimilate white immigrant youth, not to provide rehabilitative
services to all children, regardless of color. The McKeiver Court stood
willfully blind to the reality that children of color were not afforded
“fairness, concern, sympathy, and paternal attention.”85 If the Court
had confronted the radicalized nature of the case before it, the DMC
landscape might look very different today.

79

Matthews, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36; See also supra note 4, at 649–648 (highlighting that
“the Court [in Gault] discussed the applicable… history of [the] jury trial…the Court
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C. The Experience after Gault–McKeiver
It took less than a decade after McKeiver for state courts to
begin explicitly endorsing punitive goals in juvenile justice, contrary
to McKeiver’s premise that juvenile proceedings were of a
fundamentally different nature than criminal proceedings. For
example, in State v. Lawly,86 the Supreme Court of Washington noted
the possibility “that the accountability for criminal behavior, the prior
criminal activity and punishment commensurate with age, crime and
criminal history does as much to rehabilitate, correct and direct an
errant youth as does the prior philosophy of focusing upon the
particular characteristics of the individual juvenile.”87 In In re Seven
Minors,88 the Supreme Court of Nevada opined that “[b]y formally
recognizing the legitimacy of punitive and deterrent sanctions for
criminal offenses[,] juvenile courts will be properly and somewhat
belatedly expressing society's firm disapproval of juvenile crime and
will be clearly issuing a threat of punishment for criminal acts to the
juvenile population.”89
The 1990s saw a boom in juvenile punishment when
politicians, the media, and academics began stoking moral panic with
prognostication of an oncoming generation of juvenile “super–
predators.”90 The term “super–predator” was coined by Professor John
DiIulio, who predicted a new breed of animalistic youngsters willing
to “kill, rape, maim, and steal without remorse.”91 DiIulio’s
predictions were explicitly racist, positing that “as many as half of
these juvenile super-predators could be young black males” due to
“moral poverty” in the black community.92 “My black crime problem,
and ours,” opined DiIulio, “is that for most Americans, especially for
86
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average white Americans, the distance is not merely great but almost
unfathomable, the fear is enormous and largely justifiable, and the
black kids who inspire the fear seem not merely unrecognizable but
alien.”93
Although there was no actual increasing pattern of youth
violence in the 1980s and 1990s,94 the perception flourished that
violent attacks against white victims by youthful, nonwhite assailants
were rampant.95 The rhetoric sparked a “get tough” response to
juvenile delinquency.96 This new orientation toward juvenile
punishment was targeted squarely at youth of color. Four out of every
five new children detained in 1983 to 1987 were children of color.97
There was a 41% overall increase in cases involving detained youth in
the period from 1985 to 2008. For African American youth, this
number increased to 85%.98 For white youth, incidents of detention
increased only 19%.99
This war on youth also prompted massive increases in police
presence in schools, disproportionately so in communities of color.100
The proliferation of police on school grounds resulted in a more
punitive approach to normal adolescent behavior.101 Where once
school officials dealt with school misbehavior, children were
increasingly confronted by school resource officers for even minor
misconduct.102 The consequence was a spike in referrals of children
from school to the juvenile justice system, which disproportionately
syphoned students of color out of school and into court.103 In
jurisdictions across geographic regions, African American children
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were 2 to 3.5 times more likely than white children to be referred from
school to the juvenile justice system.104
II.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF INFORMALITY

In light of the disparate experience of children of color in the
juvenile justice system, the stunted framework for procedural rights
under Gault poses a particularized threat to children of color.
“Fundamental fairness” affords children of color inadequate protection
against the implicit bias that pervades the juvenile system. Every
procedural right withheld from children under the Gault rubric creates
a pocket of discretion through which bias can seep into the system.
One unique way in which implicit bias affects children is that it
influences the way adults perceive the inherent characteristics of
adolescents. Adolescent development research finds that youth are
more impetuous, susceptible to negative influence, and have a more
difficult time weighing the consequences of their actions than
adults.105 These characteristics of youth are stable across ethnicities.106
However, a string of studies indicates that the intrinsic characteristics
of youth are weighted differently by observers depending on the race
of the child in question.
First, a 1998 study of probation reports suggested that
probation officers’ attribution of causes of crime to character traits of
the defendant rather than external factors increased when the
defendant was black, resulting in harsher recommended sentences.107
Second, a pair of 2004 studies of police officers and probation officers
found that the subjects were more likely to rate hypothetical child
offenders as less immature, more morally culpable, and more
deserving of punishment if the subjects were primed to believe that the
child was African American.108 And third, a 2012 study concluded that
members of the general population are more likely to attribute
blameworthiness to a juvenile defendant when primed to believe the
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defendant is black than they are if given the same set of facts
pertaining to a white defendant.109
It appears that individuals, including key decision makers in
the justice system, have a more difficult time viewing black youths as
children who have all the diminished culpability attendant to minority,
than they do white youths.110 The result is that black children are
punished more and to a greater degree.111
The procedural protections that were withheld under the
Gault–McKeiver line of cases could have been used to shield children
against the threat of bias. For instance, the right to a public trial,
explicitly rejected in McKeiver, would allow for more public
accountability of courtroom actors and improved scrutiny of discretion
exercises. Public trials play a role in reducing government oppression
and corruption, especially in cases containing a racial dimension. 112 In
his McKeiver dissent,113 Justice Brennan acknowledged the racial
nature of the Burrus facts and stated frankly that the case presented “a
paradigm of the circumstances in which there may be a substantial
‘temptation to use the courts for political ends.’”114
Of course, McKeiver also denied juveniles in delinquency
proceedings the right to a jury trial, and the detrimental impact of that
on children of color may be severe. Juries play many important
functions beyond mere fact-finding. For instance, a jury may give
more careful consideration to each case than would a judge who has
seen similar cases countless times before.115 Thus, rather than relying
on stereotypes formed through mass exposure and desensitization to
juvenile defendants, juries can offer individualized attention to each
individual child. Furthermore, judges are exposed to facts such as
suppressed evidence and the juvenile respondent’s prior record
throughout the proceedings, increasing the risk that an impermissible
inference will be made, consciously or subconsciously, in the course
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of adjudication.116 As a consequence of its embrace of the Child
Savers narrative and refusal to consider the experience of children of
color, the McKeiver plurality brushed aside these concerns on the
ground that they were arguments better directed at criminal
proceedings and ignored the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile
system.117
Another drawback to denying juveniles a jury right is that
procedural informality may actually hinder the rehabilitative process
by decreasing youth confidence in the fairness of the juvenile justice
system. 118 Juvenile respondents have a better perception of juvenile
proceedings when a jury is involved.119 Failure to provide the
trappings of a formal process causes confusion and resentment in
juvenile respondents.120 This effect is especially pronounced in
nonwhite juvenile respondents.121 Gault itself cited a study warning
that when children perceive lax procedural protections they may be
more likely to resist rehabilitative efforts.122 By using lenient
procedures, we are hindering the rehabilitative task by communicating
to children that the process is unfair and that there is no value in
participating in it.
The unfairness is compounded in sentencing outcomes.
Juvenile convictions are not just used to determine the punishment of
the present charge, but may also be used to increase penalties for later
convictions.123 Much of the racial disparity in juvenile sentencing that
116
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is not explained through racial bias is accounted for by differences in
prior records.124 But when one considers that those prior records were
themselves likely tainted by racially biased juvenile proceedings in
which the respondent was not afforded his or her full fundamental
rights, the power of that rationalization loses its luster.
Finally, withholding juries deprives juvenile respondents of the
potential to benefit from jury nullification when a law is unjust or is
applied unjustly to that particular youth. Jury nullification refers to a
jury’s ability to acquit the accused based on equities rather than the
legal elements of the crime.125 Jury nullification takes on a particularly
important role when the criminal law intersects with race. Jury
nullification was, for instance, used to allow violators of the Fugitive
Slave Act to circumvent conviction.126 Furthermore, Paul Butler
famously advocated for black jurors to nullify convictions against
certain nonviolent black defendants.127 Butler’s premise is that black
jurors may rationally find that the social cost of removing one of their
own from the community and into prison outweighs the law
enforcement interest in reaching a verdict of guilty.128 In the same
way, a jury should have the opportunity to decide whether removing a
child from the positive influences of the community and placing that
child into a state institution imposes higher costs than benefits.
III.

SOLUTIONS

One necessary solution would be for the Supreme Court to
augment Gault’s “fundamental fairness” protections with the full
protections of the Bill of Rights. Gideon accomplished a similar task
in the adult context when it applied the Sixth Amendment to broaden
the right to counsel on top of the Fourteenth Amendment due process
right to counsel in capital cases upheld under Powell v. Alabama.129
However, it would be naive to believe that this first step would
accomplish racial parity in the juvenile justice system. After all, the
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adult racial disparities in the criminal justice system survive despite
the recognition of fundamental rights.130
Part of the responsibility falls in the lap of defense attorneys.
Through first hand experience, defense attorneys are the actors in the
court system most aware of the problem of DMC. It affects our clients
on a daily basis. Because defense attorneys have a duty to advocate for
the stated interest of their clients, they are the actors in the court
system with the strongest motivation and the best position to push for
a change. There are several tactics defense attorneys can use to bring
race into open discussion so that the narrative of people of color will
no longer be subsumed. These tactics are as applicable in juvenile
court as they are in the broader criminal system.
First, defense attorneys should engage in local data collection.
Ideally, the public defenders office should track the race of every
defendant that comes through their office and the decisions made by
court actors at every discretion point. It is much easier to raise the
issue of race to the court with statistical backing than with hunchbased accusations. Second, defense attorneys should also participate to
whatever extent possible in governmental DMC task forces so that the
perspective of the defendant can have weight in these bodies. Third,
defense attorneys should engage in community outreach activities to
garner community support for DMC alleviation efforts. Defense
attorneys should also seek out community leaders who can testify as
cultural experts when appropriate.
Finally, defense attorneys should exercise their own discretion
in litigation in a way that brings the race issue firmly into the court’s
crosshairs. Motions to dismiss in the interest of justice, motions
raising disparate treatment on the basis of race, and motions
challenging the reliability of cross-racial eyewitness identification are
valuable tools for making sure the racial dimensions of cases are not
ignored.
IV. CONCLUSION
The experience of black children in the juvenile justice system
in the wake of both the initial reforms near the turn of the twentieth
century and the Supreme Court’s Gault–McKeiver line of cases
demonstrate that the gains from progressive reforms are not distributed
evenly. When a subjugated group’s narrative becomes overpowered by
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the narrative espoused by the dominant group, the excluded story
becomes synonymous with the excluded and oppressed people.
Suppressing a narrative results in erroneous assumptions becoming
embedded in doctrine, as the assumption of a benevolent,
rehabilitative juvenile system became embedded in Gault. This
structural flaw in the constitutional doctrine itself combined with
racial bias, excessive discretion in the wrong hands, and the weight of
history to perpetuate DMC in the juvenile justice system. We cannot
change history, but we can change the law and direct our behavior to
promote awareness of bias, to advocate compassion for all children,
and to ensure that all viewpoints can be heard, acknowledged, and
taken into account on an equal footing.

